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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE TRUST RECEIPT-ITs POSSIBLE LEGAL STATUS IN WASHINGTON-Within a period of comparatively recent date there has crept
into commercial usage an instrument known as the trust receipt.'
Because of the extensive use now being made of the trust receipt in
Washington, it is well to become acquainted with some of its legal
aspects.

In British law the rights of the lending bank under the trust receipt
have been steadfastly upheld on the ground that the trust receipt is
a necessary instrument of commerce. 2 This view has been quite generally followed in the American courts, with the difference, however,
that the courts deem it a part of their judicial duty to decide whether
these instruments (which have nothing to do with technical trusts)
are chattel mortgages, contracts of conditional sale, or something different from either. Trust receipts have been held to be conditional
the decisions, condisales .in those jurisdictions where, at the time of
tional sale contracts did not have to be recorded.3 On the other hand,
at least one writer contends that the creditor (the banker) is a mortreceipt arrangement constitues, in legal
gagee, and that the trust
effect, a chattel mortgage. 4 At any rate the earlier view was in favor
of the banker, one court going so far as to classify the trust receipt
in order to avoid the harsh rule making conditional sales
as a bailment
5
fraudulent.

Not all of the courts, however, have allowed themselves to be annoyed by the classification problem. The federal courts have decided,
instead, that the trust receipt is an instrument suz geness, and perfectly legitimate when confined to its proper use. 6 But the trust receipt is not always confined to its proper use; and hence the question arises: what shall be done in a case where the dealer receives the
goods directly from the manufacturer, giving the latter a trust receipt
therefor wherein it is expressly stated that the title to the property is
reserved in the manufacturer as a security for the purchase price; or,
I The trust receipt was originally employed in importing transactions. In
pursuance of the agreement between the buyer and his banker, the seller delivered the goods or bills of lading to the banker, who accepted or paid the
seller's draft. The goods or documents of title were then turned over by the
banker, to the buyer against a trust receipt in which the latter acknowledged
the banker's title and agreed to hold the goods for a special purpose, as "trustee" of the banker.
2In re Young, Ex parte Carter (1905) 2 K. B. 772; David Allester Ltd.
Case, (1922) 2 Ch. 11.
SDow8 v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 91 U. S. 618, 23 L. ed. 214 (1875) 2foors v.
Kidder, 106 N. Y. 32, 12 N. E. 818 (1887) Farmers Nat. Bank v. Logan, 74
N. Y. 568 (1878)

Barry v. Bontnger, 46 Md. 59 (1876), Moor v. Wyman, 146

(1888), Nio Haven Wire Co. Cases, 57 Conn. 352, 18
Atl. 266 (1888).
'See 9- CoL. L. REv. 395, 546 (1922). The Trust Receipt as Security, by
Mass. 60, 15 N. E. 10

Mr. Karl Frederick.
5Brown v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 90 (1894)
6 Century Throwing Co. v. Muller 197 Fed. 259, 116 C. C. A. 614 (1912)
In re Cattus, 183 Fed. 733, 106 C. C. A. 171. (1910), Charavay 4. Bodvtn v.

York Silk Mfg. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (1909).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
if a banker finances the deal, what shall be done where the banker
receives his title from the dealer instead of from the manufacturer?
Is there anything in such a transaction to distinguish it from a chattel
mortgage and thus enable it to escape the condemnation of the recording statutes? Clearly not; and the courts are carefully examining
every trust receipt transaction for just such thinly-veiled chattel mortgages and conditional sales.
Judging by the number of cases in which this spurious use of the
trust receipt has been the subject of litigation, it would seem that
bankers and business men are slow to grasp the distinction between a
trust receipt given for goods the legal title of which had passed to
the bank direct from the debtor himself, and a trust receipt for goods
whose title passed from a third person, usually a foreign exporter or
a domestic manufacturer, to the bank. It is the failure to observe
this distinction to which can be attributed much of the present-day
hostility to the use of the trust receipt, which ordinarily is not
recorded.
While the banker's rights have been upheld against parties claiming
under the importer as judgment or attaching creditors," pledges,9
lienors,' ° and trustees in bankruptcy,"' there does not, as yet, seem to
have arisen a case wherein there had to be considered the rights of
one who, without knowledge of the relationship existing between the
banker and the importer by virtue of the trust receipt, in good faith,
buys the goods from the importer giving full value therefor, only to
discover that the importer never had the title to the goods, or authority
to exercise any rights of ownership over them. 12 However, there are
a few cases so closely related to this precise point that it seems entirely
possible to formulate a rule applicable to this particular state of facts.
Thus, it has been held that the claims of the banker are superior
to those of an innocent purchaser for value of the importer's claim
against the purchaser of the goods from such importer."3 In another
case 1 the lending bank was allowed to prevail against the claims of
an innocent pledgee of the importer, regardless of the legal principle
that upon a question of priority a pledgee stands upon the same
footing as a purchaser, and, where the legal owner has put it into the
power of the debtor to make a fraudulent pledge, the pledgee's claim
is superior to that of the real owner. 15 Finally, in Massachusetts it
IIn re Gerstman, 157 Fed. 549 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907) In re Shulman, 206 Fed.
Br. See. Co. v. Amer. 8_Br. Mfg. Co., 975 Fed. 1-1 (1921)
129 (1913) Amer
Bell v. N Y Safety Steam
Salinas City Bank v. Graves, 79 Cal. 192 (1889)
Jordan v. Federal Trust Co., 296 Fed. 738
Power Co., 183 Fed. 274 (1910)
(1924) In re Schuttig, 1 F (2d) 443 (1924).
'In re Beboulin Fils 8S Co., 165 Fed. 24o (1908).
9 Moors v. Kidder see note 3, supra.
1o Centivry Throwing Co. v. Muller see note 6, supra.
L In re Cattus, see note 6, supra.
12 The reference here is to a bona fide purchaser for value.
13 In re Dunlap Carpet Co., 206 Fed. '726 (1913).
*Moors v. Kidder, see note 3, supra.
"131 Cyc. 811.
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has been held 6 that a bank taking a trust receipt to insure realization
of advances made by it to finance an importation of goods is not liable
for reimbursement to a customhouse broker who, without knowledge
of the banker's interests and at the request of the importer, advanced
money to release the goods from the customhouse.
To be sure, in no one of these cases was the injured person a bona
fide purchaser of the goods, because he was not an outright purchaser
thereof; yet it cannot be denied that in each instance he stood in a
legal position similar to that of a bona fide purchaser inasmuch as he
parted with value in actual reliance upon the ostensible ownership of
the specific goods in the importer. If the courts were inclined to
regard a trust receipt as invalid against a bona fide purchaser, here
was ample opportunity to express such an inclination.
From the foregoing decisions it may be justly concluded that, as the
use of the trust receipt 'has become more common, the courts have
come to modify in some particulars the policy underlying the Statute
of Frauds, by which the divorce of title from possession is declared
either evidence of fraud or fraudulent per se, and to resort to the
doctrine that possession in one person, which is consistent with an
agreement betNveen the parties, is not inconsistent with the actual title
in another, and will be supported for the purposes stated in the conract, even against
a bona fide purchaser from one having possession
7
without title.'
What view will Washington take? Under certain provisions of the
Uniform Acts relating to Bills of Lading,' Warehouse Receipts,19 and
Sales,20 very definite limitations"- will have to be placed upon the
banker who, though he reserves the actual title to himself, intrusts
the importer with the documents of title, solely on the strength of an
unrecorded trust receipt.
It is hardly possible that our Court would classify the trust receipt
as a chattel mortgage, because such a classification would have to be
based upon a theory of mortgages to which the Court stands positively
opposed, namely, that the legal title to the property mortgaged passes
to the mortgagee (tfle banker) .22
There remains the possibility that the Court might treat the trust
receipt as a contract of conditional sale and thus compel its being
16 Downing Co. v. Shawimutt Corp'n, 245 Mass. 106, 139 N. E. 106 (1923).
This doctrine is enunciated in Century Throwing Co. v. Muller, see note
6, supra.
18 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3678; P 0. § 459.
19 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3627 P C. § 7181.
"Laws 1925, Ext. Sess., Ch. 14-, p. 355, §§ 30, 31.
21 These limitations are discussed in 8 MiNN. L. Rsv. 144 (1924).
' Marsh v. Wade, 1 Wash. 538, 545, 20 Pac. 578 (1889) Richter v.
Buchanan, 48 Wash. 32, 9-2 Pac. 782 (1907). The old common law doctrine that
a mortgagee becomes the owner of the legal title is rapidly losing ground, even
in its application to chattel mortgages; while the modern trend is, as in this
State, to treat the chattel mortgage as creating a lien merely. For an alignment
of the states on this question see 11 C. J. 399, notes 2 and 3.
17
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recorded. It has been forcibly pointed out, however, that it is not a
conditional sale contract.23
Although our Court may hesitate to adopt the bold, though very
practical, view of placing the trust receipt in a category by itself and
uphold it as an established and highly useful commercial instrument,
because it may be subjected to the criticism of being an indulgence in a
"bit of legislation," '24 yet, on the contrary, it may be said that it is
just as much a "bit of legislation" for courts to construe an instrument to be that which it was never intended to be, and from which it
differs in -certain marked aspects, viz., a chattel mortgage or a conditional sale.
If the trust receipt is indeed "a fraud upon the law," as one judge2"
has termed it, the use of which, if not actually declared illegal, ought
to be encompassed by the strictest regulations, the matter would seem
to be for the legislature to regulate. In that way, and only in that
way, will the trust receipt be recognized for what it really is-an
anomalous contract relation.
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that the course of legal development
will continue to be in the direction of recognizing, separating and perfecting the security interest in its security relation and functions, and
to regard the trust receipt as distinct from the chattel mortgage, conditional sale, bailment or pledge, and consider it as an instrument
sui generts, perfectly effective within its limits. Thus it will be
possible to raise the trust receipt to somewhat the same level as other
documents of title, such as the warehouse receipt and the bill of lading,
which today afford the banker ample security for his loan.
Harry 0. Arend.

23 "The consideration is furmshlng funds, not goods. A suit brought by the
security holder would not be for goods sold and delivered, but money lent to or
furnished the buyer. The buyer is purchasing from the original seller, and not
from the lender. Should the goods fail to reach the lender, the debtor would
nevertheless be liable." 13 CAL. L. REV. 333 (1925).

6 CORELL L.

2-4

Q.

168, 175 (1921).

25 Judge Hough in the Liberty Silk Case, 152 Fed. 844 (1907).

